Saturday, December 9, 2006

HOPE After Hurricanes?

HOPE After Hurricanes?
When I returned to South Florida after Hurricane Wilma in October 2005 I passed the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s tent on Indiantown Road in Jupiter. I thought how exciting and fulfilling it would be to work in a project helping those who had suffered losses from the hurricane. Within six months I would not only be terribly disappointed by my experiences working for the state through a FEMA grant, but would be driven to the point of leaving that job because of the near complete waste of time and resources that were squandered in that program. I feel cheated, as I believe are the hundreds of people I interviewed along the way in Palm Beach County. Some were living in conditions that resembled third-world countries, their trailers damaged beyond repair, their walls mocked with mildew and their spirits often shattered.

The project was named H.O.P.E.—Helping Our People in Emergencies (similar programs exist all across the state at the present time in areas hit by the vicious hurricanes of recent years.) The main objective of the program was to help people cope with the aftermath of the hurricane and provide them with useful resources to help mitigate some of the psychological and property damages they suffered.

I began working for Project H.O.P.E. by sitting beneath the FEMA tent for five weeks at the corner of Indiantown Road and Military Trail doing next to nothing. On “good” days I, and the team I worked with, would see on average of about two or three people during an eight-hour day.

Providing resources to hurricane survivors was supposed to be a key service of the program. Promised resources disappeared as quickly as leaders of the program announced them, as if they never really existed for most people who were promised help. One group—a good example of how resources weren’t provided—a faith-based organization, provided the labor to complete hurricane-damage related projects if survivors provided the materials. I filled out referral after referral to this agency, until learning that their money had run out and that they would not be able to perform any of the services they purportedly offered. Resource after resource proved to be the same dead end for hurricane survivors. As soon as a particular city or town announced that it had grant money set aside to provide for damage repair, that money seemed to disappear overnight, much like the blue skies before a storm.

Personnel within the program were a separate and often disturbing issue. Some counselors were naturals at listening to survivor’s woes, but most crisis counselors in the program were totally inept at the simple counseling skill of listening to people in the different areas in the county we canvassed. We were grouped into teams of about ten people serving different geographical areas in four offices in Palm Beach County.

Some team members in different groups appeared to want to have nothing to do with actually knocking on doors and speaking with people. Many would wander in at ten or eleven o’clock in the morning—we started at nine o’clock—and left in the early afternoon. There was absolutely no give or take among many members of groups that is absolutely essential to performing group goals.

As the project shifted its emphasis to prepare residents of the county for future hurricanes, the lack of cooperation was most obvious. I had written a book, A Hurricane Story, for presentation to upper-elementary school students. Unfortunately, not being able to illustrate the book, I asked members of the project with artistic ability to help out with the illustrations for the book. In each case I was either denied help or offered the kind of assistance that would not have allowed me to complete the text and read it for children as an attractive and effective piece of writing.

Leadership was totally inept within the program, but their hourly reimbursement was quite generous at $25.00 per hour plus liberal travel reimbursement. Leaders often had no more professional training or any additional expertise in counseling or group dynamics than other team members. Gross violations of team cohesiveness were the usual mode of operating.

The worst violation of ethics came from the program’s top leadership, who refused to address any of the group’s problems, instead portraying the project as one happy family. One group member threatened to do violence to another member with whom he had had a disagreement. Absolutely no sanctions were ever taken with that individual, nor was he counseled on how to deal with strenuous situations while canvassing that had led to his outburst.

The most obvious breach of leadership ethics came when several representatives of different organizations, representing different facets of FEMA, came together to meet last February with groups from the H.O.P.E. offices all over Palm Beach County in Delray Beach to discuss the project. Leadership repeatedly told group members that this venue was “not the place to air dirty laundry.” The session went as planned by the leadership of the program, and not one complaint was lodged and the panel representing FEMA left thinking that we were performing miracles in the county.

I was cautious of the faith-based link that was constantly reinforced by the project leaders and many team members. I strongly favored the direct involvement of local, state and federal governments instead, as a way to ameliorate the damage done by hurricanes. Churches need to be largely supplemental to that process. On several occasions we met as a group in a particular church in the area, where during one meeting a group member who was also a church member at this church invited us to go into the sanctuary and reflect. What could be more inappropriate for a group working for the government?

I recently met with people I had known while working for the project. They reported for work about three hours a day as the program drew to a close by the end of November 2006. Some days they stayed away from the office when the project director was not in. When the word went out that the director was returning, they would return to the office and go through the motions of actually “working,” even though they reported there was absolutely nothing to do. They said that they would soon be collecting unemployment benefits for several months, which I thought peculiar since any actual work in the program had ended for all intents and purposes many, many months ago! One project worker reported being so bored that he and a companion from the program laid quarter on the railroad tracks in West Palm Beach to pass time.

A series of articles written in The Florida Sun-Sentinel documented that FEMA had paid $22.6 million to Florida for the kind of “crisis counseling” of Hurricane Wilma and Katrina victims that I had witnessed. Adding insult to injury on the part of FEMA, the Associated Press reported on December 5 that that same agency had spent $17 million in housing and rental payments to Hurricane Katrina victims who had already received those housing benefits. The Government Accountability Office was somewhat less generous in terms of measuring FEMA’s squandered funds, placing the figure at one billion dollars!

When I began working for Project H.O.P.E. I had high ideals and wanted to make a difference in the lives of people who suffered emotional problems and property damage as a result of hurricanes. I left with a slight readjustment in my understanding of how inept bureaucracies can be, when lacking leadership—I believe planning for the program was both shoddy and for the most part missing—resources and trained workers in dealing with the aftermath of hurricanes.

1 comment:

Gabe L. said...

These are the subjects they teach in the first class at RIC School of Social Work: ethics, professionalism, supervision, respect for clients, understanding of client and co-worker diversity, the ethics of funding social service agencies.
Maybe FEMA's leadership needs a refresher course?